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FOREWORD
Never before in peacetime has the United States placed so
much emphasis and reliance on the Armed Forces' Reserve
Components. Since the Total Force Policy was introduced by
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970, this dependency has
grown even more. The 1990 mobilization for OPERATION DESERT
SHIELD and the follow-on offensive OPERATION DESERT STORM in 1991
validated the use of the Reserve Components for contingency
operations and guaranteed the policy's extension for the
foreseeable future.
Yet, even with the renewed emphasis on the Reserve
Components' roles, their legal basis, mission, mobilization,
training, force structure, and relationship to their respective
Active Component remain relatively little understood. There are
relatively few, if any, single source references pertaining to
these Reserve Component areas.
This Strategic Studies Institute report responds to the
growing strategic importance of the Armed Forces Reserve
Components. Declining defense budgets leading to small Active
Component forces, coupled with inherent dangers facing the world
community in a multipolar world, makes the use of Reserve forces
on a recurring basis a necessity. This is especially true for
Reserve Combat Support and Combat Service Support Forces not
readily available in the Active Components. In essence, because
of the relatively short time in which contingency operations
unfold, the Reserve Components have become the Nation's strategic
reserve insurance policy.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director, Strategic Studies Institute

SUMMARY
This study is unique among recent works published by the
Strategic Studies Institute because it is primarily a survey of
current basic information concerning the Armed Forces Reserve
Components. In addition, it provides an analysis and forecasts
their status and roles in the future.
The study explains the Total Force Policy, its origins and
application from 1970 to its first test in 1990 and 1991 during
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The post-cold war
defense reductions have caused an even greater reliance upon the
Reserve Components than anticipated by the Defense establishment.
The legal basis for the establishment of the Reserve
Components for the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast
Guard (a part of the Navy upon mobilization) and the reason there
are two separate reserves for the Army and Air Force are
reviewed. In the final analysis, the legal foundation for the
reserves rests with the U.S. Constitution and the traditions of
the nation. In the 20th century, legislation has been passed
placing greater reliance on the Reserve Components while
enhancing their readiness.
Over the years Reserve Component categories of individual
service and types of active duty performed have been refined and
defined. The complexities of the modern world necessitated
increased flexibility when utilizing citizen soldiers. Access to
reservists depends upon the individual's category of service
ranging from the immediately available Selected Reserve to the
prior service Individual Ready Reserve. There are also different
categories of active duty which an individual reservist performs
either involuntarily or voluntarily. The types of training range
from Annual Training to the newest category, Active Duty Special
Works.
Each Armed Service and the Reserve Components within each
service have varying management structures, all of which are
legislated by the Congress. A detailed description of each is
given within the text of this report. In the case of the Army and
Air Force there are two Reserve Components each, the National
Guards of the individual states and the Federal Reserve. For the
Navy, Marine Corps and the Coast Guard there is only a Federal
Reserve.
While there are similarities in pay, benefits and
entitlements differ between the Active Components and their
reserves. Reservists on active duty do receive the same pay, and
much of the same allowances as their active counterparts.
However, entitlements differ depending on the length of the tour
of active duty.
The need for well-equipped, organized, and trained Reserve
Components increased after the 1898 Spanish- American War. As a

consequence the need for full-time support for the Reserve
Components progressively increased as modern warfare became more
and more complex and deadly. Today this support ranges from
Active Component soldiers serving with the Reserve Components to
government civilians and also reservists on active duty.
Gaining access to the Reserve Components is well-defined and
the decision to mobilize reservists for overseas deployment or
domestic missions is a political act prompted by the severity of
the national emergency. Five mobilization categories will bring
reservists to active duty. Each category requires varying degrees
of approval from the chief executive to the Congress. The
categories range from Selected Mobilization to Total
Mobilization.
After reviewing those elements of commonality among the
Armed Forces' Reserve Components, the study considers in detail
the state National Guards and the Federal Reserves of each Armed
Service in the Defense establishment. The sections on each
Reserve include a brief history of its evolution in the Defense
establishment. The report gives an overview of each component as
it exists today regarding command, manning, structure,
management, stationing, equipment, training, and education.
Next the author projects what the future holds for each
Service's Reserve. This section is speculative; however, it
considers past peacetime periods in which the Armed Forces and
their reserves have languished without funding or interest on the
part of the government and its citizens. This perspective,
however, is tempered by the realization that the United States
has never found itself to be the only superpower in a multipolar
world. This is coupled with the recent experience of what the new
order will bring in the 21st century in terms of using armed
forces. Examples of the new missions are numerous and include the
Gulf War, Bosnia, Somilia, Haiti, Hurricane Andrew, the 1994
California earthquake, the 1994 California urban riots, and
midwestern floods. All of these incidents required the use of
Reserve Component individuals and units and give a clear
indication of what the Armed Forces and their Reserve Components
should expect well into the next century.

TOTAL FORCE:
EDERAL RESERVES AND STATE NATIONAL GUARDS
Introduction.
The United States has evolved a unique reserve system for
its military establishment. It is a system that was originally
constructed partly as a result of an 18th century fear of
standing armies and strong centralized governments, and is
imbedded with myth and tradition. It is a system that is laced
with domestic politics, spiced with states rights, and contains
strong citizen-soldier lobby groups. The reserves today are
divided between the state militias or National Guards and Federal
Reserves for the Army and Air Force, while the Navy, Marines, and
Coast Guard have only the latter. Although U.S. wars are fought
and won by citizen armies, the reserve system has rarely met the
readiness claims of its citizen-soldiers or the Regular, now
called Active Component (AC), establishment. Each military
service's components, Active and Reserve, warily regards the
other with skepticism and, at times, hostility. American society
has accepted the contentious nature of the relationship between
Regular and citizen-soldiers be they reserves, wartime volunteers
or conscripts. However, in the major wars citizen-soldiers have
been the nation's saviors. The fact that the Regular
establishment has traditionally borne the first onslaught of a
conflict or that its professionalism has molded the citizen
forces mobilized to fight the nation's wars is usually lost in
the euphoria of citizen-dominated Armed Forces' victory over an
enemy.
Today, the Armed Forces' Reserve Components (RC), to include
the U.S. Coast Guard which, although under the Department of
Transportation in peacetime, is part of the Navy during a
national emergency or war, play a greater role than ever in
national security. The Cold War was partly responsible for this
increased reliance because the Soviet threat appeared so
overwhelming and the cost of maintaining large Active forces was
prohibitive. Then, too, it is due partly to the failure to
mobilize, except for a small number, the RC for the Vietnam War.
After this Asian war many defense analysts and military leaders
claimed that the eventual lack of public support could be
attributed, in part, to President Lyndon Johnson's failure to
fully mobilize the reserves, and that this politically motivated
decision, in turn, did not fully commit the American public.
As a consequence, as the Vietnam War ended, a new policy was
evolved that had significant impact on the nation's reserve
forces. On August 21, 1970, the "Total Force Policy" for the
Armed Forces was introduced by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.
It was a vehicle to promote a reduced response time for the
reserves to back a small Active establishment in a national
emergency. Also it was seen as an economy measure in anticipation
of the defense budget's growth to eventually accommodate the

increased cost of all-volunteer forces planned for commencement
in 1972. In 1979, the policy was spurred on by the beginning of a
massive rearmament program initiated by President Jimmy Carter's
administration after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. According
to the Department of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board, the
Total Force Policy "implies an increased interdependence of
active and reserve forces. It absolutely requires that the
availability and readiness of reserve forces must be as certain
as the availability of active forces."1 Thus, once again, the RC,
as they were prior to Vietnam, would be the immediate and primary
source of additional forces in a national emergency.
The Armed Forces' responses were varied. Those that are
"platform" oriented, that is depend on large weapons systems such
as aircraft and vessels, the Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force,
approached the policy differently than the two services which are
manpower intensive, the Army and Marines. Obviously, the loss of
a number of ships and aircraft in a major war, given the length
of time required by defense industry to replace such high
technology weaponry, would result in excess manpower. In the Air
Force, for example, some reserve pilots have greater experience
because of prior active duty with the AC and civilian jobs with
airlines which equates to more flying hours than their active
counterparts. As for the Navy's experience, it is almost
impossible to man a vessel with reservists in any considerable
number because of the complexity of modern technology. Such is
not the case with the Marine Corps and the Army. A conflict of
any proportion would result in initial manpower and unit
requirements. Also, combat losses would need to be replaced
immediately, initially from the reserves. Then too, it is
expensive to keep on active duty certain type units such as
Graves Registration and Civil Affairs for which there is no
immediate requirement upon mobilization.
The 1990 Persian Gulf War saw a return to the use of the RC
in a national emergency and was seen by many as the Total Force
Policy's vindication. The reserves of all the services mobilized
and deployed, sometimes in advance of active forces. Reserve
combat and support units representing the Marine Corps, Navy, and
Air Force, and Army support units deployed.
The Gulf War can now be seen as a unique event. As a
consequence of Cold War preparations, both the AC and the RC were
better prepared than in the nation's past major wars. However,
the public's inclination after a conflict is to return to
normalcy as rapidly as possible. This attitude carries over in
terms of defense appropriations and strength authorization so
that active and reserve peacetime establishments are usually
minimum forces. The surprising part of this traditional approach
to war is that the ACs of all services have had, in varying
degrees, problems successfully integrating their reserves within
their establishments in peacetime for reasons that range from the
traditional hostility between citizen-soldiers and Regulars to
competition for scarce dollars. The successes and problems with

attempts at integration will become readily apparent as the
reserves are examined below.
The Legal Basis for the Reserve Forces of the United States.
The Constitutional basis for state reserve forces resides in
Article 1, Section 8, giving Congress the power to call out the
militia of the states and to "provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining" citizen-soldiers. However, it became apparent,
beginning in President George Washington's first administration,
that other citizen forces would be required to support the
nation's Regular forces during wartime. Thus, an unsuccessful
attempt was made to create a "Federal Militia." However, the wars
which followed the birth of the Republic used Federal volunteers
and then, for the first time during the Civil War, citizen
conscription. All these actions were authorized under the
Constitution's Article 1, Section 8, which gave Congress the
power to "raise and support Armies . . ."
Today, the legislative basis for all United States reserve
forces is Title 10 United States Code, Armed Forces (10 USC).
This legislation states the reserves' purpose:
. . . to provide trained units and qualified persons
available for active duty in the armed forces, in time
of war or national emergency and at such other times as
the national security requires, to fill the needs of
the armed forces whenever, during, and after the period
needed to procure and train additional units and
qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization,
more units and persons are needed than are in the
regular components.2

Title 10 United States Code lists the Reserve Components of
the Armed Forces within the Department of Defense (DOD) as the
Army National Guard of the United States (ARNG); Army Reserve
(USAR); Naval Reserve (USNR); Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR); Air
National Guard of the United States (ANG); Air Force Reserve
(AFRES); and Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR). As indicated earlier,
the latter reports to the Department of Transportation (DOT) in
peacetime and the Coast Guard may become a part of the Navy in
war or national emergency. Within these reserve forces there are
three categories in which individual reservists are placed
regardless of the service–the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and
Retired Reserve.
Reserve Categories of Service and Active Duty.
The Ready Reserve consists of units and individual
"reserves" liable for call-up by the President under the
authority of section 673b of 10 USC. There are over 1,800,000
individuals in this category. Within the Ready Reserve are
several separate categories. There is a Selected Reserve composed

of units and totaling about 1,000,000 individuals.3 The units are
manned and equipped to serve as required. Their members are
"drilling" reservists who perform regularly scheduled training of
48 paid drill or training assemblies which are 4-hour periods
(IDT–Inactive Duty for Training) and perform Annual Training (AT)
of not less than 14 days per year. At home station in their local
communities, reserve units usually conduct Multiple Unit Training
Assemblies (MUTA) which are four 24-hour periods, one weekend per
month. These are called MUTA-4.
The Selected Reserve contains full-time support personnel in
the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program. The term AGR is used by
the Army and the Air Force; however, the Navy refers to the
program as TAR (Training and Administration of Reserves) and the
Marine Corps as FTS (Full-time Support). Within these programs
are reserve personnel who have volunteered for active duty status
to perform a variety of duties to include organizing,
administering, recruiting, and instructing the reserves. Those
individuals in units are assigned authorized mobilization
positions.
This Reserve category also includes Individual Mobilization
Augmentees (IMA). This program is available in the Federal
reserves only. Individual reservists augment the staffs of AC
units, major commands and Executive Branch departments such as
DOD and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These
reservists are required to perform at least 14 days of AT. There
is also a small subcategory of IMA called Drilling IMA (DIMA).
Individuals in this program perform the same number of Inactive
Duty for Training (IDT) and Annual Training days as units do.
The Selected Reserve is unique because the President is
authorized to order it to active duty other than during a
declared war or national emergency (10 USC 673b). Section 673b
states that not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve
may be on active duty at any one time. These reservists are
authorized to serve for 270 days. The Congress can extend the
time further as it did for ARNG combat maneuver units in the 1991
Gulf War. This authority is popularly known as the "200K
call-up."
The Ready Reserve also contains the Individual Ready Reserve
(IRR). The IRR is a pretrained manpower pool of individuals who
have served in an AC or one of their Selected Reserves and have
not completed their mandatory service obligation, which is
currently 8 years. It has about 776,000 members.4 It is only
applicable for Federal reservists. The IRR can be ordered to
active duty involuntarily for training, but this is rarely done.
Its members have a low priority in terms of training and unless
they volunteer and funds are available, they will not be trained.
These individuals are not affected by a Presidential 200,000
call-up. However, the President can call the IRR to active duty
involuntarily along with the Selected Reserve if he declares a
national emergency (10 USC 673). In 1984, Congress mandated that

each service screen their IRR annually.
Distinct and apart from the IRR is a category of National
Guard soldier or airman in the Inactive National Guard (ING).
These approximately 7,000 Guardsmen are inactive individuals
attached to an Army or Air Guard unit, but are not part of the
Selected Reserve.5 They are required to muster once a year, but
do not train nor do they receive compensation.
The Standby Reserve is composed of individuals,
approximately 26,000, who retain their military affiliation, but
are not part of the Ready Reserve.6 They have been designated key
civilian employees, or have a temporary disability or hardship.
They do not train and are not in units. This also is an exclusive
Federal Reserve category. Over the years since Vietnam, DOD has
made strenuous efforts to reduce this manpower pool. Individuals
in this category may be involuntarily called to active duty
during a war or national emergency with the approval of the
appropriate Service Secretary and Secretary of Defense.
The Retired Reserve is composed of individuals who have been
honorably retired and are receiving retired pay on the basis of
having over 20 years of active duty. All reserve soldiers are
eligible for retired pay at age 60 if not serving in the Ready or
Standby Reserves. A Service Secretary has the authority to order
to active duty involuntarily retirees if such a call-up is in the
interest of national security. Retirees, by DOD directive, are
placed in one of three categories by age. Category I contains
those who have been retired not more than 5 years and are under
age 60. Category II are those individuals retired more than 5
years, under age 60 and physically fit. Category III includes all
other retirees.
In addition to training under the categories of AT and IDT
performed primarily by Selected Reserve soldiers, there are
several other categories of active duty in which a reservist can
serve. There is Active Duty for Training (ADT). In this category
a reservist can obtain additional training to enhance his or her
skills or to gain new skills such as Airborne qualification or
learn a new Military Occupation Specialty (MOS). ADT may also
include attendance at any level of training or schooling from
Initial Entry Training to Senior Service College. It is also used
for training on active duty beyond AT. IRR soldiers can volunteer
to perform ADT as "fillers" for Active and Reserve units engaged
in major exercises such as Reforger in Europe. Another category
in which a reservist may serve is Active Duty Special Work
(ADSW). This does not involve training per se, but rather uses
the expertise of the individual to perform work to enhance the
RC's readiness. Lastly, there is Temporary Tour of Active Duty
(TTAD). A reservist who volunteers in this category is selected
by virtue of his or her skills not readily available in the AC.
All types of active duty but the latter are paid from funds
specifically authorized by Congress for the reserves. While
serving in each category except TTAD, reservists serving less

than 179 days are not counted against the AC strength which, like
the Reserve, is established by law.
Management of Reserve Forces: Congress and the Department of
Defense.
Congress, under the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8,
is the final authority to manage the reserves of the various
Armed Services. Reserve issues are overseen by the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees and the Defense Subcommittee of
the respective Houses of Congress Appropriations Committee.
Congress enacts laws establishing policies and guidelines from
pay and allowances to officer promotions and force structure. Of
special interest to Reserve forces is annual congressional action
establishing strength authorizations which, in turn, are used to
support pay and allowances. Congress can and does insure, from
time to time, that moneys appropriated go directly to the
respective Reserve Component for installations and equipment
purchase. These funds are, therefore, "fenced" for specific
purposes within the reserves.
The Secretary of Defense delegates overall responsibility
for reserve forces to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve
Affairs) (ASD/[RA]). This office works directly with the Service
Secretaries of the various Departments and with the Armed Forces
leadership. Acting through the ASD/RA is the Reserve Forces
Policy Board (RFPB). By statute, this board is chaired by a
civilian and is composed of general officer representatives from
all the Armed Forces and their Reserve Components. Membership
also includes the civilian Assistant Secretaries (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) of each Service. The board, the principal
advisory group to the Secretary of Defense on reserve matters, is
required to submit an annual report on the Reserve Components'
status to Congress and the President. The report focuses on
reserve readiness and makes recommendations as to how the
reserves can be improved.
Unique within the management structures of the Army and Air
Force is the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The Bureau fulfills the
need for the Defense establishment to have a centralized agency
to work with the 54 separate state and territory National Guards.
By law, 10 USC Section 3040, the NGB is both a staff and
operating agency whose chief reports to the Secretaries of the
Army and Air Force through their respective Service chiefs. The
NGB is the avenue by which the Federal Government communicates
with the states; i.e., the governors and the Adjutant Generals,
the latter usually appointed. The NGB then becomes the clearing
house for dealing with individual states. The Bureau controls
funding, total strength, force structure, and equipment. It also
develops state regulations for the National Guards.
Pay, Benefits and Entitlements for the Reserves.

Pay, benefits, and entitlements eligibility are directly
related to the reservist's type of service. As with the AC, basic
pay and allowances depend on length of service and rank.
Reservists may receive special pay as aviators or medical
personnel or hazardous duty pay for personnel in authorized
positions such as airborne, or deep sea diving.
Benefits are available depending upon the service member's
reserve status. When performing IDT duty for pay and for
exchanging one 4-hour drill period for one day of privileges,
Ready Reserve members and their families may use a post/base
exchange, a department-type store. Ready Reservists and their
families also have access to commissaries (food stores) based on
the number of training days performed during the previous
calendar year, up to 12 days. Ready Reservists may use military
clothing stores, recreation facilities, clubs and other services
while on IDT, ADSW, TTAD, AT, and ADT. They are eligible for
full-time Serviceman's Group Life Insurance and may participate
in the Montgomery GI Bill Educational Assistance Program. While
on active duty they may also receive limited medical care. Since
1986, reservists have been subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice in an IDT status as they are when on active
duty. Reservists can be recalled to answer for crimes committed
in any active duty category.
Full-Time Support of the Reserves.
In 1906, a system of providing full-time support (FTS) to
reserve units was begun. As technology increased and warfare
became more complex, full-time support programs emerged for all
the RC. FTS personnel insure continuity and stability which
improves unit readiness. They provide administrative, logistical,
operational and training support to reservists. Today, there are
three FTS categories. The first is Active Guard/Reserve (AGR).
This category was described previously in the section "Reserve
Categories of Service and Active Duty." Next is FTS Military
Technicians and Air Reserve Technicians, a category that applies
only to the Army and Air Force RC. These are Selected Reservists
who are Federal civilian employees providing FTS in reserve
organizations and units. Closely related to this category are
Civil Service, both Federal and state, who also support units and
organizations, but are not required to be drilling reservists.
Lastly, a small number of AC personnel are assigned or attached
to RC organizations and units. These soldiers provide advice,
liaison, management, administration, and maintenance support.
Gaining Access to the Reserves.
Today, five mobilization levels can be utilized to gain
access to U.S. reserve forces. Also, reservists may and are asked
to volunteer their services to enter active duty in peace and
war. Legally, under Title 10, United States Code, the threat's
seriousness to national security governs the mobilization level.

The reserves are affected by each level.7
• Selective Mobilization (10 USC 3500, 8500; 10 USC 331,
332; 10 USC 673). Congress or the President may order the
expansion of the AC Armed Forces by mobilizing reserve units
and/or individuals. This level of mobilization would not be used
for a contingency operation required to meet an external threat
to national security, but rather a domestic threat to the safety
and well-being of citizens. The 1992 Los Angles riot is an
example of this mobilization level.
• Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (10 USC 673b). The
President, by Executive Order, may augment the AC to meet
operational requirements by calling to active duty up to 200,000
reserve personnel for up to 270 days. As indicated previously,
this authority is known as the "200K call-up." The President is
required to notify Congress and explain the reasons for his
actions. President George Bush exercised this option after the
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
• Partial Mobilization (10 USC 673, 673b; 10 USC 6485).
Congress or the President may declare a national emergency and
issue an executive order for the augmentation of AC Armed Forces
with up to one million soldiers (President only) as individuals
or in units from the Ready Reserve for up to 24 months. Congress
can pass legislation establishing any limit for a partial
mobilization. Preparations for offensive OPERATION DESERT STORM
required a partial mobilization after a Presidential declaration
of a national emergency in January 1991 which was issued in order
to freeze Iraqi assets in the United States.
• Full Mobilization (10 USC 671a, 672[a]). Congress is
required to pass legislation, public law or joint resolution,
declaring war or a national emergency. All reserve units and
individuals within the force structure would be mobilized and
authority is available for national conscription. An example of
this level is the 1940 U.S. mobilization after the German
conquest of France in the spring of that year.
• Total Mobilization (10 USC 671a, 672[a]). Congressional
declaration of war or national emergency, public law or joint
resolution, is required for this mobilization level. Not only are
all reserve units and individuals called-up, but additional units
are created beyond the force structure in existence, by national
conscription if necessary. All the nation's resources are
mobilized to sustain the expanded Armed Forces. World Wars I and
II are examples of total mobilization.
The Army's Reserve Components.

Background. Because the Army's reserve system is the first,
largest, and most complex, its historical development is
important in understanding the other Armed Forces reserve

systems. There are two reserve categories for the Army: the state
militias and the Federal Army Reserve. The former are the
nation's first citizen reserve, today's Army National Guard
(ARNG). The National Guard traces its origins to the colonial
militias formed in each community as a defensive force. Service
in these militias was mandatory and regular drills or musters
were conducted. During the American Revolution both long- and
short-term militia units were raised to augment the Continental
Army.
The militias were and continue to be dual mission forces
with dual loyalties. Each remains under the governor's control in
peacetime, but is available to the Federal Government in time of
war or national emergency. Although Guard units that meet AC
standards receive Federal recognition in peacetime, the parent
Armed Forces, by law (Titles 10 and 32 USC), can only advise and
coordinate training in peacetime. The Constitution makes it clear
that the Federal government does not have direct access except
upon mobilization or what is known as "federalizing" the Guard
for war or a national emergency.
The militias' performance in the Revolution and in the wars
which followed was questionable. As a consequence, the Federal
Government, beginning with George Washington's administration,
attempted from time to time to create a Federal militia in
peacetime and call for volunteers in war. Both actions have meet
with opposition from militia supporters. In the Mexican War, the
Federal Government began calling for volunteers who, although
formed into units by the states, were immediately reorganized and
placed in Federal service. At the onset of the Civil War,
President Lincoln called for militia. However, of the over 1,780
regiments raised, only 15 were in existence prior to the war.8
State designated regiments were, in reality, Federal volunteers.
The militias, resurrected after the Civil War for domestic
disturbances, were renamed National Guard in honor of the unit
the Marquis de Lafayette formed during the French Revolution.
They continued, however, to suffer from deficiencies which became
apparent on mobilization for the Spanish-American War. Further,
legal opinion was that the Constitution forbade militia
deployment overseas. In the Spanish-American War Guardsmen
volunteered as individuals. As a consequence, the 1903 Dick Act
became the first legislation in 111 years aimed at reforming the
militia. Basically, the act called for enforced Federal
standards, Regular Army instructors, and inspectors, as well as
increased Federal expenditures for equipment. Increasingly
concerned over the legal restrictions barring the Guard from
overseas deployment and lack of enforcement of Federal standards
in peacetime, the Guards' dual missions and loyalties, and the
forces' unpreparedness, the Army sought alternative reserve
forces. The Army moved modestly and cautiously in 1908 to create
a Medical Officer Reserve Corps. The new corps was legislated
into existence under the Constitution's Army clause. The National
Guards' condition after they were called up in 1916 for border
duty during the Mexican Punitive Expedition prompted the Army and

Congress to expand the Medical Reserve in the National Defense
Action of 1916 to include both officers and enlisted personnel in
all branches of the Army. The two new reserve organizations were
called respectively the Officer Reserve Corps and the Enlisted
Reserve Corps. After both proved of value during World War I, the
two were merged in the National Defense Act of 1920 as the
Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). This Federal Reserve is today's
Army Reserve. Under subsequent amendments to the 1916 Act, the
National Guards would become part of the Army of the United
States when ordered into Federal service. Federal financial
assistance was increased and Guard units couldreceive Federal
recognition in peacetime if they met Army standards.
Based on wartime experience, the Army planned a post-World
War I force comprised of 27 ORC and 18 National Guard Divisions.
In 1933, legislation was enacted to allow for overseas deployment
of Guard units.9 Unfortunately, the small defense appropriations
of the inter-war period insured that World War II mobilization
mirrored past deficiencies of AC, Reserve, and Guard forces.
At the war's conclusion, the Armed Forces struggled to
rebuild in a constrained budgetary environment. The National
Defense Act of 1947 created separate Service secretaries. Shortly
after the new organization was established, the first Secretary
of Defense ordered a committee to examine the state of the
nation's reserves. The committee issued its report, Reserve
Forces for National Security or the "Gray Report," named for its
chairman, Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray. Critical
of state forces, it recommended that all Reserve Components be
Federal. The emphasis on combat arms in modern times has always
been difficult to comprehend in light of the Guard's dual
missions. The "Gray Report" noted that "The use of the National
Guard with its present powerful armament is not generally
suitable for the execution of state missions . . . . and not
consistent with sound public policy" and that "the same forces
can no longer be expected to perform both local and national
functions and that a modern Federal striking force cannot be
prepared adequately under state control."10 At the urging of the
National Guard, Congress ignored the study.
The Cold War, commencing with Korea, brought further
increased reliance on the reserves to fight a global war against
the Soviet Union. For the Korean War, individual reservists and
reserve units were mobilized. After analyzing the Reserve and
National Guard's lack of readiness, the Congress passed
legislation attempting to improve their readiness and bring the
ORC into parity with the state forces in regard to regulations
and funding. This legislation changed the name of the ORC to U.S.
Army Reserve (USAR).
Problems continued to plague reserve readiness and were
apparent during the 1962 Berlin call-up. Intent on streamlining
the Army's cumbersome and expensive dual reserve system,
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara attempted to merge the ARNG

with the USAR. Failing to accomplish this, he then sought to move
all combat arms (infantry, armor and artillery) into the ARNG,
maintaining the USAR as a support force. In this latter attempt
he was only partially successful for the Army, with congressional
acquiescence, asked for and received back a number of USAR combat
maneuver units. However, this laid the basis for further
migration of combat units to the ARNG, leaving the USAR's
composition primarily, but not completely, support units.
Breaking with the past, President Lyndon B. Johnson made a
political decision not to fully mobilize the reserves for the
Vietnam War. As indicated previously, only a small number of
reservists and reserve units were called to active duty during
this unpopular conflict. The reserves became a haven for young
men attempting to avoid conscription. Manpower was obtained by
increasing draft calls and expanding the Reserve Officer Training
Corps and Officer Candidate School quotas.
The 1990-91 Gulf War partially broke the tradition of
reserve unpreparedness. The USAR and ARNG deployed support
forces. In this sense this conflict vindicated the Total Force
Policy. It also proved that reserve forces, when used in a
complementary role, could be successful.

The Army's Reserve Components Today. At the Cold War's end
the Total Army is going through massive changes in the number of
personnel, structure, equipment, training, and missions. As the
AC is drawn down, the RC's importance to the Total Force has
continued to grow. In fact, within the Total Army, 53 percent of
the personnel will be in either the ARNG or USAR while only 47
percent are AC. Figure 1 shows the nature of this dependency
based on projected Fiscal Year 1996 statistics. In terms of
Combat Structure (Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Air Defense,
Special Forces, Combat Engineers, Combat Aviation), in
percentages the Active Army has 48, the ARNG has 48, and the USAR
has 4 percent. Combat Support (Signal, Chemical, Military Police,
Civil Affairs, Engineers, Aviation, Military Intelligence,

psychological operations) and Combat Service Support (Medical,
Finance, Supply and Service, Quartermaster, Transportation,
Ammunition, Judge Advocate General, Railway, and Maintenance)
break down into the following percentages: Active, 35; ARNG, 29;
and USAR, 36.11
In overseas deployment planning for contingency operations,
Figure 2 shows the number of Reserve Component personnel
dedicated to what the Army calls "warfighting," which includes
"Forward Presence" units already deployed overseas; "Crisis
Response," those forces immediately deployed; and "Early

Reinforcement" units that would be the follow-on forces to
support those already deployed. The ARNG combat units are part of
a "Strategic Reserve" and what is called "Transition" or
expansion. The other than wartime mission forces also are
indicated for all three components under the heading of
"Sustaining Base."12
As one can readily observe, the reserve forces' contribution
to the Total Army is significant. No contingency operation can
take place today without mobilizing the Army's two reserves. In
order to better understand the two citizen-soldier components,
the following is a brief description of today's ARNG and USAR.

Army National Guard (ARNG). The ARNG is composed of 54 state
and territorial forces of varying strength and unit composition.
Currently, the ARNG is authorized 410,000 soldiers. Each state
Guard has a dual mission and "performs federal tasks, for
national defense and for domestic emergencies, and state tasks,
for local emergencies."13 Within the NGB is the Director, ARNG.
The director and his staff allocate available resources to
provide units for the ARNG's Federal combat mission. His office
conducts long-range planning, submits programs and budgets to the
Army Staff and administers resources for personnel, force
structure, training, and equipment.
The ARNG maintains the Army National Guard Personnel Center,
which operates as an NGB field agency. In peacetime, the Center
manages the Official Military Personnel Files of all ARNG
officers and is directly involved with those Guardsmen, officer
and enlisted, who are in the AGR program. Enlisted records are
maintained by the states and territories. Officer and enlisted
personnel data are on one personnel management information
system, the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System. The
center is also responsible for the dissemination and monitoring
of ARNG peacetime personnel policies.
The ARNG management structure (Figure 3) flows from the
Chief, NGB to the Director, ARNG. Because the ARNG is composed of
independent state forces, there is no "chain of command" from the
Department of Defense. Rather there is a "channel of
communication" to each state and territorial governor and the
usually politically appointed state official (South Carolina
elects), The Adjutant General (TAG), a Major General who may or
may not have Federal recognition of his rank outside the state.
The governor is the commander-in-chief and the TAG his Chief of
Staff who commands all state military forces. The District of
Columbia is unique in that the President of the United States is
both the commander-in-chief of it and the Armed Forces. A State
Area Command (STARC) exercises command and control of a state's
force in peacetime and assists during premobilization activities.
Historically, from the minutemen at Lexington and Concord,
the ARNG has been primarily a combat arms force. Currently, the
ARNG has 8 divisions and 45 combat maneuver brigades.

Approximately, 40 percent of the ARNG's strength is in the combat
category. Twenty-eight percent is combat support, while 24
percent is in combat service support. Because each state controls
its own forces, it has about 8 percent of its strength in
administrative support, and this includes those individuals at
Departments of the Army and Defense levels (Figure 4).14 As part
of the Army's plans for downsizing, the current structure will be
modified to allow for 15 "enhanced brigades" in a high state of
readiness and 22 others at a lesser level that are considered a
"strategic insurance" force.
Units in the Army National Guard vary in size from Military
History Detachments to combat divisions. Some ARNG major units,
such as the 35th Division Mechanized, are spread over as many as
seven states. Major units by state, for example, range from a
sole Infantry Brigade in Connecticut, to California where the
ARNG has a Troop Command, a mechanized infantry division, an area
support group, a medical brigade and a military police brigade.
As with the Active Army, within large combat formations are
smaller combat and combat service support units. Since a large
percentage of the ARNG is combat arms, the Army's drawdown has
allowed the migration of modern weapons systems, such as M-1A1
Main Battle Tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles to the
state forces.

U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The U.S. Army Reserve is a Federal
Reserve comprised of regional units and individuals located
throughout the United States that is centrally commanded and
administered. Currently it is authorized 230,000 Selected Reserve
soldiers. Additionally, about 440,000 soldiers are in the IRR.
The USAR's primary mission is to support and augment the AC. It
is, in peace and war, "under direct and immediate federal
control. . . . As a consequence, the roles and missions of the
Army Reserve are assigned directly by the Army and the
Congress."15 While it can be utilized like the ARNG for domestic

missions, it can only do so upon a declaration of a national
emergency or partial mobilization. However, unlike state forces,
its units are not restricted by state boundaries because it is a
Federal force with a direct chain of command from the smallest
detachment to the Chief, Army Reserve.
The Chief, Army Reserve has three primary responsibilities:
Chief, Army Reserve; Commander of the U.S. Army Reserve Command;
and Deputy Commanding General of Forces Command. As Chief, Army
Reserve he also serves as the advisor to the Army Chief of Staff
on USAR issues.
The Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) is the staff agency
that advises and is responsible for the Army Reserve. This office
manages planning, training, mobilization, readiness and
maintenance of the USAR. The office is responsible for three
appropriations: pay and allowances, operations and maintenance,
and construction. OCAR, as an Army Staff component, engages in
the formulation of Department of the Army polices regarding the
USAR. The Office also develops long-range plans for the USAR.
Figure 5 shows the USAR command and control relationships.

The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) is responsible for
command and control of all USAR units located in the Continental
United States (CONUS), excluding those units under control of
Special Operations Command and overseas commands. Currently,
there are 47 subordinate headquarters providing command and
control for USARC-controlled USAR units. As part of a reduction
in end strength, the USAR has a plan pending approval to reduce

this number to 31.
At present, these subordinate headquarters are a mixture of
Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) (21 of them organized on a
geograpical basis), functional or "go-to-war" commands, Divisions
(Exercise) and Divisions (Institutional Training). These
headquarters control all of the units that make up the Army
Reserve (except Special Operations Forces). The reduction plan
creates 10 Regional Support Commands (RSCs), aligned along the
boundaries of the 10 Standard Federal Regions (SFRs) used by most
Federal agencies less the Department of Defense and eliminates 10
ARCOMs. The only remaining ARCOM within the USARC that will exist
OCONUS is in Puerto Rico.16
The total USAR Troop Program Unit (TPU) composition, shown
in Figure 6, is divided into four functional areas: 56 percent
Combat Service Support, 18 percent Combat Support, 6 percent
Combat, and the balance, 20 percent, "Mobility Base Expansion"
(training divisions/brigades, garrisons, U.S. Army Reserve Forces
schools, hospitals, depot support and port operations).17 Units
range from detachments to large units such as Theater Army Area
Commands. As support type units they are to a greater extent
independent because they provide unique functions.
A Field Operating Agency of OCAR, the Army Reserve Personnel
Center (ARPERCEN) commands and controls USAR soldiers not in
TPUs. Its mission is similar to the AC's Personnel Support
Command. It provides life cycle management for those soldiers not
assigned to USAR units and is assuming similar responsibilities
for TPU members. The Center is also responsible for the
administration and records of the IRR, IMA program, Standby
Reserve and retirees of all components to include the Retiree
Recall Program. USAR AGRs are managed by the Full-Time Support
Manning Center co-located with ARPERCEN but reporting directly to
OCAR. Although ARPERCEN's motto is "Management for Mobilization,"
it has inherited mission responsibilities that have little to do
with the Reserve, such as management of records for World War II
Philippine Scout veterans. These missions are holdovers from the
old Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center
operated by the Army's Adjutant General.
Equipping USAR units has not been as easy as with the ARNG.
Since the USAR does not mirror the AC as does the ARNG, equipment
has not migrated in similar quantities. Additionally, the type of
major end items of equipment for bakeries and laundries does not
appear as glamorous as M-1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles
and therefore does not appear as necessary for war. Therefore,
the Reserve must rely heavily on programs such as Dedicated
Procurement. As a consequence, "the USAR still lags significantly
behind all other DOD [Department of Defense] Reserve Components
in the amount of equipment actually on hand when compared to
wartime requirements."18

Training the Army's Reserve Components. The Total Army
Training Study conducted in 1984 developed the Reserve Components
Training Development Plan. Revised annually, this document
integrates all reserve training initiatives into a comprehensive
plan which provides the blueprint for pre- and post-mobilization
training for individuals and units. The study identified
requirements and recommended methods, new and existing, to train
the ARNG and USAR to Army standards as individuals, crews, and
units.
Individual enlisted soldiers and officers may attend any AC
school or course provided there is a need for the training or
education, a space is available, and the soldier meets certain

admission criteria. Some admissions, especially in the Federal
USAR, require board approval for such schooling as the Sergeants
Major Academy and Command and General Staff College. There are a
number of major training programs to enhance the ARNG and USAR's
unit readiness. One of the most significant is CAPSTONE, a
management tool that aligned the reserves and the AC within a
wartime organizational structure. The organizational structure
was then used as a basis for planning and training USAR and ARNG
units, allowing them to make the fullest use of limited training
time to focus on wartime missions and build a relationship with
the AC units they would operate with in wartime. Other programs
such as Affiliation, Partnership and Counterpart, as the names
imply, build closer relationships between the AC and the USAR and
ARNG. The Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) Program further
expands CAPSTONE by allowing reserve units to deploy and train in
overseas areas they might be sent to after mobilization in a
national emergency.19
New programs continue to be introduced. As a result of the
inability to deploy the ARNG roundout brigades for the Gulf War,
Congress passed The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform
Act of 1992. Also in 1992, BOLD SHIFT, a program in which AC
teams assist in individual, unit and leader training in the USAR
and ARNG, was introduced. The ARNG's Project Standard Bearer and
the USAR's Project PRIME focus on training units identified as
part of the Contingency Force Pool (CFP), those which would be
mobilized and deployed early in a crisis.20
The Air Force's Reserve Components.

Background. As with the Army, the U.S. Air Force has a dual
reserve. A National Guard air arm began in 1908 when the New York
National Guard volunteered to form the Signal Corps' 1st Aero
Company. After the creation of a Regular Air Service in 1907, the
first National Guard fixed wing unit appeared. In 1911 an Aero
detachment was formed in California and in 1915 the First Aero
Company, New York National Guard, was federally recognized.21 The
1916 National Defense Act established an Aviation Section in the
Signal Corps and created a Federal Reserve of 296 officers and
2,000 enlisted personnel. As a consequence, the first Air Force
Reserve Aero Squadron organized in 1917 and deployed to France
that same year. The Army Air Corps gained equal status with other
Army branches in 1926 when it became the U.S Army Air Corps.22 In
the inter-war period, from 1919 to 1940, the AC ORC and the
ARNG's air assets suffered from limited funding. In fact, the Air
Corps was so chronically undermanned that it used reservists who
were not counted against manpower ceilings on a regular basis.
Both were relatively insignificant in terms of providing units
during the mobilization for World War II. The ORC provided 1,500
trained pilots for the Army Air Corps during the critical period
just after Pearl Harbor.23
At the conclusion of World War II the Air Force was

reorganized. An Air Defense Command was established for
continental U.S. air defense. This command was given the mission
to provide for the organization, administration, training, and
maintenance of the National Guard and Reserve Air Force elements.
The former expressed a desire to "reconstitute the air
capability" of the state National Guards. The Army Air Force was
less than enthusiastic. However, Chief of Staff George C.
Marshall overrode objections in an effort to obtain support for
post-war Universal Military Training and supported the
establishment of the Air National Guard (ANG) in late 1945.
However, the Air Force continued to object to the lack of direct
control and reporting chain to state air assets.24
The National Security Act of 1947 created a new "National
Military Establishment" which authorized the Air Force as a
separate service. Three military departments, headed by civilian
secretaries, Army, Navy, and Air would report to a Secretary of
Defense. The National Guard Bureau would have two separate
divisions, one Army and the other Air Force. The Bureau itself
would remain under the Department of the Army. The Air Force was
still concerned about this Army oversight and the lack of direct
control of state forces and questioned why a governor required
state air elements. The controversy came to a head following the
Gray Report. The Secretary of the Air Force convinced the Defense
Secretary to request legislation merging the ANG with the AFRES.
The National Guard lobby killed the proposed merger. However, the
legislation made it clear that the National Guard Bureau would be
denied the power to interfere with Air Force and Army operations
through the Bureau's divisions.25 Once the issue was resolved,
the Cold War insured emphasis on both the AFRES and ANG. During
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administrations increased
attention was paid to the AFRES and ANG, primarily as a result of
the successful use of air power during the Korean War and a
deliberate attempt by the Chief of Air Force to influence
congressional delegations in favor of his service. In addition to
continental U.S. air defense, the ANG absorbed additional
missions such as those in the Tactical Air Command which included
fighters, reconnaissance, troop transporters, heavy equipment
lift, and medical evacuation. The AFRES was similarly tasked and
duplicated these missions. Unlike the Army, the Air Force, over
the following years, used both the ANG and AFRES in real world
missions without the need to mobilize by using individual
volunteers. Examples of such mission deployments range from
Berlin and the Pueblo Crisis, in 1961 and 1968 respectively, to
airlift into Grenada in 1983 and JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989.
Indeed, the Total Force policy was very much a part of the Air
Force philosophy after the Korean War and prior to its
introduction in the early 1970s. It was and is much easier for
the Air Force AC to validate standards because it was dealing
with a more manageable force that applies its skills frequently.
Some reservists have related civilian experience in aviation.
These factors account for the relative short time to mobilize and
deploy air assets. As a platform oriented service composed of
small crew formations and individuals, it has been far easier for

the active force to integrate the ANG and the AFRES into a Total
Force.
During the 1990 Gulf War the ANG provided early augmentation
of the deployment with two Military Airlift Groups on a voluntary
basis prior to mobilization. These were quickly followed by
reconnaissance and air refueling tanker units. After mobilization
other ANG support units followed including a Mobil Aerial Port
Squadron and two F-16 squadrons.26 The AFRES deployed 12 out of
14 C-141 and C-130 squadrons, all of its C-5 assets, one A-10
fighter unit, all of its medical elements, and other smaller
support assets such as Aerial Port, Security Police, and Fire
Protection units.27

The Air Force's Reserve Components Today. The Air Force has
faced the realities of the Cold War's end. Its performance in the
Gulf War, heightened by media attention, has not exempted it from
downsizing. Even prior to the current reductions, beginning in
1973, missions have been slowly migrating to the Reserves and
Guard. The active force's manning level has decreased by one
third since 1986. During that time the RCs have grown slightly to
match increasing missions. However, the Air Force continues to be
a power projection force that can be immediately deployed to the
scene of a conflict anywhere in the world. Indeed, the Air Force
was able to respond first with major deployments of assets to
Saudi Arabia in August 1990 and the Air Force also transported
the 82nd Airborne Division and other Army units to the Gulf from
the United States and Europe. In accomplishing this, heavy
reliance was placed on ANG and AFRES units and individuals.
Today, the ANG comprises 117,676 (19 percent) and the AFRES
81,539 (13 percent) of the Air Force Total Force of 623,180
(Figure 7).28 Also about 112,000 airmen are in the IRR. The RCs
dominate many Air Force missions. For example, the AFRES
contributes 100 percent of the aerial spraying capability, 71
percent of the aeromedical evacuation assets, and 50 percent of
the strategic airlift crews. The ANG provides 92 percent of the
continental U.S. interceptors, 86 percent of the tactical/weather
reconnaissance assets and 70 percent of the communication units.
For a complete breakdown of ANG and AFRES contributions to the
Total Force, see Figure 8.29
All reserve units in peace and war are assigned to an AC
command. These major commands are Air Mobility, Air Combat, Air
Force Special Operations, Pacific Air Forces, Air Force Materiel,
Air Force Intelligence, Air Training, and U.S. Forces Europe.
These commands set training standards, provide advisors, and
evaluate the Reserve Components. Through these commands both the
ANG and the AFRES perform worldwide missions.30 These missions
include airlift support to the U.N. force in Somalia, domestic
counter narcotics efforts, fighting forest fires, and many other
real world tasks both at home and abroad.
Both the ANG and the AFRES, as their Army counterparts, are

separate and distinct components. What follows gives a general

overview of these reserve forces.

Air National Guard (ANG). At the NGB level there is a
Director of the ANG who has equal status with the ARNG Director.
The Constitutional constraints also apply to the ANG and,
therefore, as with the ARNG, there is a "channel of
communication" from the Department of Defense (See Figure 3). The
ANGs are state and territorial forces available to the Federal
Government when required. While not all the aircraft and units
within the ANG are compatible with state missions, some, such as

medical and engineering and security units, are used by governors
as are individual airmen. The 54 state and territorial governors
are the Commanders-in-Chief of their respective Guards which are
immediately available for state missions. The Adjutant General is
the Chief of Staff for both the Air and Army National Guards,
making state forces joint in nature. The ANG shares
responsibilities in the State Area Command (STARC); however, each
state and two of the four territories maintain an ANG
headquarters. Every state and territory has at least one of the
80 ANG installations in its geographic boundaries.
Also similar to the ARNG, the ANG has a larger percentage
of its approximately 400 units in the combat category of
continental interceptor and tactical fighter wings than in
support areas. As with the ARNG, the 117,000 Air Guardsmen either
are unit members or in an inactive status. Other than combat
formations, ANG units include tactical control and combat
communications, engineering installation, communications and
mission support, weather, aircraft control and warning, civil
engineering, medical, security police and range control. Examples
of the type of units within a state range from the New York ANG
with two airlift groups, a rescue group, a fighter group and
wing, and a tactical control group, to Delaware with a single
airlift group.31
Many ANG units fly the same type and model aircraft flown by
the AC. At times there is a migration of older aircraft; however,
as the Air Force becomes smaller much of the equipment passed to
the ANG is in the state-of-the-art category. Air combat units
utilize F-16, F-15, A-10, F-4G, and RF 4C aircraft. ANG units,
which provide personnel and cargo transportation capabilities,
are equipped with KC-135 C-5A, C-141, and C-130 aircraft. Some
B-1s are in the Kansas Air National Guard.

Air Force Reserve (AFRES). The AFRES is a Federal Reserve.
Its chain of command (see Figure 9) flows directly from the Air
Force Chief of Staff to the Chief of Air Force Reserve, who is
dual-hatted. The latter heads the Office of Air Force Reserve and
is the principal advisor to the Chief of Staff. In this capacity
the Chief establishes policy and develops plans and programs. In
addition to staff functions, the Chief of Air Force Reserve also
commands the Air Force Reserve.
Headquarters, AFRES is located at Robins Air Force Base,
Georgia. From there the Chief Air Force Reserve exercises control
over three Air Force Commands. The 4th Air Force at McClellan Air
Force Base, California is responsible for providing airlift, C-9
aeromed evacuation, rescue and special operations units; the 10th
Air Force at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas oversees five
fighter wings, an air refueling wing, and one composite wing; and
the 14th Air Force at Dobbins Air Force Reserve Base, Georgia
supports airlift and weather reconnaissance units. These major
commands provide for the administration and supervision of the
unit programs, provide logistic support, review and manage unit

training, and validate combat readiness of units in their
respective geographic regions. Most of the AFRES units, upon
mobilization, are gained by either the Air Combat Command or Air
Mobility Command. A field operating agency, the Air Force Reserve
Personnel Center, located in Denver, Colorado, provides personnel
services to all AFRES and ANG members.
AFRES units are equipped with cargo C-141, C-130, C-5 and
KC-135. Combat aircraft in the AFRES include F-16, A-10 and
HH/MH-60 (helicopter). As a Federal Reserve the AFRES has an
Associate Aircraft Program which provides trained crews and
maintenance personnel for approximately 300 AC aircraft. This
program pairs a Reserve unit with an AC unit who then share a
single aircraft. Aircraft types in the program include C-5, C-17,
C-141, C-9, KC-10 and B-52.

Training the Air Force's Reserve Components. Reservists are
trained at AC Air Force training and educational facilities. They
range from crew and pilot training to Senior Service College.
Unit training is conducted by full-time technicians who are civil
service employees during the week and reservists on drill
weekends. Much of what is considered training is performed as
real-world missions such as humanitarian airlifts and support of
all AC missions.
The Naval Reserve (USNR).

Background. President Thomas Jefferson believed that the
nation was best served, not by standing military forces but by
citizen militias. As a consequence he suggested creation of a
national naval militia in 1805. In the same period several
seacoast states established naval militias. A number of these

units survived to augment the Union Navy during the Civil War. In
May 1888, Massachusetts brought back the concept by establishing
a naval battalion as part of the state militia. A decade later 16
states followed suit. In 1898 these militias served in the
Spanish-American War. The Navy Department eventually established,
in 1914, a Division of Militia Affairs. A year later, in March
1915, Congress legislated into existence a "Federal Naval
Reserve," the forerunner of the modern Naval Reserve.32 This
Federal organization eventually supplanted the state militias.
The Federal United States Naval Reserve (USNR) has provided
personnel in every war since its establishment. Over 300,000 Navy
reservists served in World War I and all Navy draftees
(2,000,000) were classified as reservists in World War II. The
USNR spearheaded the space shuttle "Challenger" salvage and in
1987 two USNR minesweepers deployed at the height of the war
between Iraq and Iran. In the Gulf War, USNR personnel deployed
to the Gulf. Over half of these reservists were medical
specialists. USNR sealift specialists, air-naval gunfire liaison
officers, harbor masters, cargo handlers, Seabee (construction)
battalions, search and rescue detachments, and port security
personnel also deployed to the Gulf. During the War other
reservists augmented Naval commands worldwide.33

The Naval Reserve Today. A Reserve or AC rear admiral heads
the USNR command and control structure (Figure 10) and is based
in Washington, DC. As the Chief of Naval Reserve, this officer is
also the Director of Naval Reserve and Commander, Naval Reserve
Force. The Chief of Naval Reserve is the principal advisor to the
Chief of Naval Operations for planning, policies, programming and
budgeting.

The Naval Reserve Force Command is a field command operating
in New Orleans. It has primary responsibility for operations,
training, administration, and readiness of all Naval reservists.
Its responsibilities include the TAR, the IRR, and IMA programs.
Colocated are two subordinate commands, Naval Surface Reserve
Force and Naval Air Reserve Force. Both are commanded by Reserve
flag (general) officers. The senior of the two is the Deputy
Commander, Naval Reserve Forces. There is also a third reserve
command located in New Orleans, the Naval Reserve Recruiting
Command, responsible for the recruitment of manpower to fill
Naval Reserve units and individual Selected Reserve positions.
The Selected Reserve is authorized a strength of 118,000 which is
12 percent of the Navy. Another approximately 160,000 are in the
IRR.34
Selected Reservists serve either in "commissioned" or
"augmentation" units in over 250 training sites across the
nation. Commissioned units, comprising 20 percent of the Selected
Reserve, are self-contained organizations possessing their own
major end items of equipment. These units are structured to
mobilize and be functionally independent or deploy along side AC
units. The types of units in this category include ships,
aircraft squadrons, construction battalions, cargo handling
battalions, mobile inshore undersea warfare units, and special
boat units. Eighty percent, approximately 2,500 units, are in the
augmentation category. These units are composed of reservists
with professional skills in, for example, medicine, intelligence,
and law. These units augment just about every AC organization.
Upon mobilization these skilled personnel are immediately
available to serve as an individual asset or as unit members.35
The USNR's contribution to the Navy's Total Force is
significant. The force contributes 100 percent of the Navy's
total assets in five areas: heavy airlift, composite aircraft,
strike rescue, embarkation assistance and harbor protection. Over
50 percent of the Reserve units are the areas of shipping
control, cargo handling, military sealift, Seabee battalions, and
intelligence/security (Figure 11).36

Training the Naval Reserve. USNR personnel attend Navy
educational and training institutions as required. Contributory
support, reservists using their skills to support on-going fleet
operations, not only enhance readiness training, but also add
needed manpower to support the AC in peacetime. Other training
programs are available. One of the newest is the Naval Surface
Reserve's Innovative Naval Reserve Concept. It has been applied
to the Fast Frigate Program. Eight FF-1052, Knox Class, frigates
have been designated training "platforms" and are under the
USNR's operational control. Each frigate in the program trains a
Selected Reserve crew and four cadre crews. The cadre will then
be available as nucleus activation crews for decommissioned
ships.

The U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR).

Background. The authority for the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
(USMCR) resides in an appropriation act passed by Congress on
August 29, 1916. Two days later the Navy Department issued
General Order 231 establishing "A U.S. Marine Corps Reserve to be
a constituent part of the Marine Corps . . . ."37 When war was
declared in April 1917, USMCR strength consisted of three
officers and 32 enlisted men. By the end of World War I, the
authorized strength had climbed almost 80,000. In the inter-war
period the Congress passed an act to establish a formal
organizational structure for the USMCR. The basic unit became
Fleet Marine Corps Reserve company. When World War II broke out
there were 23 Marine Reserve battalions and 13 Reserve air
squadrons. Ultimately, 68 percent of the Corps during the war was
composed of reservists. During the Korean War the entire USMCR,
88,500 men, was mobilized. At Inchon, half the 1st Marine
Division was comprised of USMCR personnel. The USMCR was
reorganized in 1962 into the structure that exists today. It
includes the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and
4th Force Service Support Group.
Not mobilized for Vietnam, the USMCR activated over 31,000
reservists for the 1990 Gulf War. Of this number 13,000 deployed
to Southwest Asia. Forty percent of the 2nd Marine Division was
comprised of USMCR members. Numerous smaller USMCR combat and
support units were composed entirely of reservists. Several
reserve combat units successfully engaged the enemy.38

The Marine Corps Reserve Today. Because the Marine Corps is

a smaller service within the Navy, its reserve is integrated
within its own command and control structure. The Commandant of
the Marine Corps is responsible for the USMCR. His Deputy Chief
of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, an AC general officer,
is the principal staff officer for USMCR matters. The Assistant
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Reserve Affairs
Division. The USMCR command and control structure is shown in
Figure 12.

An AC general officer commands the Marine Reserve Force
(MARESFOR) which is headquartered in New Orleans. In this command
are five Fleet Marine Force major subordinate commands and a
support command. The headquarters provides a centralized command
structure for all USMCR elements, and its staff is comprised of
both AC and Reserve personnel.
Subordinate to the MARESFOR are a number USMCR elements. The
AC Fleet Marine Forces' USMCR units are organized in a Marine
Division (MARDIV), a Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), a Force Service
Support Group (FSSG), and two Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)
commands. These organizations are each commanded by Reserve
general officers and are colocated with MARESFOR. The MARDIV
consists of nine infantry, two tank, one armored infantry
assault, and one light armored battalion and combat and combat
support units. The MAW has 19 squadrons of fixed and rotary wing

aircraft and an antiaircraft battalion plus support units. The
FSSG is composed of seven support battalions. The MEB command
elements are organized as command and control nuclei for a Marine
Air Ground Task Force upon mobilization. All in all, the USMCR
comprises 25 percent of the total Marine force structure and 33
percent of the manpower, 42,000 Selected Reserve authorized
strength with approximately 70,000 IRR.39 The USMCR contains 100
percent of the Marine Civil Affairs Groups and 50 percent of the
force recon and air naval gunfire units, as well as significant
percentages of other type units (Figure 13).40

Under MARESFOR is the Marine Corps Reserve Support Command
headquartered in Overland Park, Kansas. Commanded by a Reserve
general officer, the center administers the IRR, provides
training opportunities to USMCR members during AC exercises, and
may activate IRR members on a voluntary basis to support special
projects, mobilization screening, and professional education
courses.41

Training the Marine Corps Reserve. The small Marine Corps
strength minimizes segregated training for USMCR personnel.
Reservists are educated and trained by the AC across the board.
Special two-week courses for the USMCR are available at regular
intervals. They are primarily Military Occupation Specialty
refresher training or review specific aspects of Marine Corps
doctrine. Reservists, like their AC counterparts, may attend a
full range of training and education programs provided by the
other Armed Services. Unit members and IMA train on an annual
basis. The USMCR is called upon annually to augment AC exercises.
Lastly, there is the Reserve Counterpart Training program. This
type of training allows individual reservists to serve alongside
their AC counterparts for 2-4 weeks working in the specialty.42
U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR).

Background. The Coast Guard was first established in January
1915 when the Revenue Cutter Service merged with the Life-Saving
Service. Although the Coast Guard, since 1967, operates as part
of the Department of Transportation, it is, by law, one of the
U.S. Armed Forces. It operates as part of the Navy in war or
national emergency; its personnel and ships transferred to
operational control of Navy commanders.
In 1939 the first Coast Guard Reserve was established. On
February 19, 1941, this civilian component became the Coast Guard
Auxiliary. The Coast Guard Reserve provided 144,000 personnel for
World War II. After the conflict, the civilian auxiliary
languished until the end of the decade when reserve personnel
began to meet informally to train without compensation. Several
years later, legislation passed in 1950 drastically increased the
Coast Guard's port security mission. With the growing tensions
brought about by the Cold War, Congress, as part of an
across-the-board strengthening of the Armed Forces, created a
paid drill Coast Guard Reserve. The first unit of this peacetime
force was organized in October 1950 in Boston. For the wars which
followed there were no reserve activations. However, as in the
Armed Forces reserves, individual members volunteered for the
Korean War and Vietnam. During the Gulf War over 1,600 Coast
Guard Reservists were called to active duty to perform in-theater
port security and port out-loading in the United States.

The U.S. Coast Guard Reserve Today. The USCGR is "directed"
by an AC Rear Admiral who serves as Chief, Office of Readiness
and Reserve, reporting directly to the Coast Guard's Commandant.
The Director does not command the USCGR. The reserve chain of
command does not differ from that of the AC. The USCGR is
organized into 10 Reserve Districts and 46 "Groups" encompassing
units in 39 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
Guam. Units are the responsibility of local AC commanders (Figure
14).43
Currently, under Title 14, U.S. Code and, unlike the other
four Federal Reserves of the Armed Services, only the USCGR can
be involuntarily called to active duty for not more than 30 days
in a 4-month period and not more than 60 days in a 2-year span to
meet the surge demands caused by a manmade or natural disaster
without a Presidential declaration of a national emergency. Also
this reserve force is not restricted from acting in a law
enforcement capacity as are the other Federal Reserves.44
The USCGR has an authorized Selected Reserve strength of
10,000 serving in units and about 8,000 in the IRR.45 Most of the
units directly augment local AC commands. One hundred percent of
the Coast Guard's deployable port security units are in the
USCGR. Other type units include small stations, marine safety
offices, operational shore facilities and command and control
elements, repair and supply, and air stations. Only 3.5 percent

of the Total Force USCGR personnel serve aboard vessels (Figure
15).

Since USCGR personnel are primarily augmentation forces,
they are integrated in a number of Coast Guard missions and have
specific responsibilities, for example, port management

operations. They perform port security, safety, and environmental
inspections at all levels: district, group, and marine safety
offices. Additionally, reservists are integrated into the
operations of small boat units where they stand watch, perform as
crew members, coxswains, and boat engineers. This type of
augmentation is especially useful for "surge operations" such as
narcotic interdictions, intercepting illegal immigrants, and
combatting natural disasters. Some 200 reservists were called to
active duty for Hurricane Andrew and 500 more served in midwest
flood relief operations in 1993.

Training the Coast Guard Reserve. USCGR members
similar formal training and education programs as do
Component counterparts. The Reserve performs over 53
its training duties in direct support of operational

attend
their Active
percent of
missions.

Reserve Forces of the United States and the Future.
Post-war and peacetime environments have never been easy for
U.S. Armed Forces. In the peacetime periods between war there has
been, especially in the 20th century, a struggle between Active
and Reserve Components for personnel strength and portions of a
decreasing defense budget. Coupled with this fratricidal warfare
for scarce dollars are other contentious issues: end strength,
force mix, missions, and recruiting, equipping and training
reservists.
In many ways today's post-Cold War demobilization is vastly
different than those in the past. There is a difference because
of the introduction and institutionalization of two concepts.
First is the Total Force Policy and second, the elimination of
conscription and the introduction of the smaller, but costly
all-volunteer forces. Both have placed the Armed Forces reserves
into a position to assume greater roles in defense than ever
before in the nation's history.
Prior to his resignation, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
conducted what he called The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New
Era. The results were announced on September 1, 1993. The Armed
Forces, the Review stated, must be prepared to "field forces
sufficient to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major
regional conflicts."46 However, only by using the reserves
extensively would the Armed Forces be able to accomplish this
requirement. As indicated in the individual reserves training
programs, emphasis is being placed on reserve forces' readiness.
The Bottom-Up Review has remained the Clinton administration's
defense blueprint, thus insuring a prominent role for the
reserves into the future. However, problems exist for the Armed
Forces because of the built-in dependency on their pre-trained
citizen-soldier forces.
One problem that affects all the services is accessibility
to their reserves in conflicts less than major regional

contingencies, the type of conflicts that are more likely in the
future. In a Department of Defense contracted study by the
Institute for Defense Analyses released during the spring of
1994, there was general agreement that there will be a "need for
RC units and individuals in lesser contingencies and operations
other than war (OOTW)."47 One significant example is the
deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia. A postal unit available
from the USAR was required. Unable to gain access to a Selected
Reserve unit without the President invoking a 200K call-up under
10 USC 673b or declaring a national emergency, volunteers were
called for and a provisional unit created which did not function
well. Another problem in Somalia was that after combat forces
landed, the mission should have, in the author's opinion, been
turned over to Civil Affairs units, which units have members who
in their civilian lives manage cities and towns from sanitation
to government and police forces, exactly what was needed for a
country in chaos. This was not done because these units are in
the RC. Had these units been deployed, the results, for the
military, the Administration, and for Somalia might have been
better.
The Defense Department's response to the growing need for
reservists and reserve units was to ask for legislation which
would allow the Secretary of Defense to call-up 25,000 Selected
Reserve members for contingencies and operations other than war.
In the fall of 1994 Congress refused to act upon the request,
but, as of this writing, later agreed to reexamine the issue. Not
certain that such authority would be forthcoming, DOD is
continuing to examine the long-standing policy of seeking reserve
volunteers for operations and institutionalizing procedures. A
recent study on volunteerism acknowledges that the Air Force
"uses volunteers routinely for peacetime operations."48 The
reason is simple: air crews are small and the skill levels of
reservists are equal to or better than the AC. The other
Services, especially the Army, require greater numbers of
individuals in units (vessels) that require lengthy
post-mobilization training and cohesion prior to deployment. In
the final analysis, volunteerism is less than a satisfactory
option for all but the Air Force. However, the DOD will continue
to institutionalize this option as long as it lacks the
Secretarial 25,000 call-up authority.
The senior leadership of the Active Components has
traditionally been uncomfortable with large reserve formations
and the command of these by senior reserve officers. Volunteerism
precludes the need and perceived "problem" created by bringing
large reserve forces and reserve senior officers onto active
duty.
Another problem that will plague the reserves in the future
is the inevitable reduction in training operations tempo
(optempo). The Bottom Up Review requires the maximum effort be
made to ready reserve forces for combat. However, in FY 1995, for
example, the budget allows the USAR to train only those units in

the Contingency Force Pool (pre-identified units that would be
required early in an emergency).49 Other than enhanced ARNG
combat maneuver brigades, which would be necessary if there were
two major regional contingencies, the FY 1995 budget does not
contain funds for any other Guard brigades.
The absence or reduction of meaningful RC training in the
past has led to a decline in reenlistment which has created a
significant annual turnover of personnel and ultimately resulted
in lower readiness levels. With the uncertainty about the
ultimate size of the reserves, there is also a reluctance to
enlist and once the reserve drawdown is completed in 1999,
recruiting for the reserves will become even harder.
The other difficulty facing the reserves is the increasing
technological revolution and pace of modern maneuver warfare. It,
therefore, will become increasingly difficult for combat maneuver
forces in the Reserve Components to deploy in a contingency
without extensive and lengthy post-mobilization training. With a
downsized AC, the numbers of personnel used to conduct RC
post-mobilization training will be harder to come by.
The future of the USAR, as a consequence of an "Off-Site"
agreement announced in December 1993 by former Secretary Les
Aspin, appears bright. One result of the agreement was the
eventual migration of most of the remaining combat arms structure
from the USAR to the ARNG, leaving the former Reserve Component
primarily combat service support. It is likely that there will be
further moves to define the support role for the USAR and the
combat role for the ARNG.50 As a consequence, the USAR will form
the bulk for early mobilized and deployed reserve units. Almost
all of the USAR's Troop Program Units will be part of the
Contingency Force Pool and its other units, which support
mobilization, will be utilized even before the deployment of AC
units in the event of a regional conflict.
The same holds true for the USNR. The complexities of modern
naval warfare limit the use of ships that are exclusively manned
and commanded by reservists. Those ships "manned" by reservists
actually have 80 percent Active Component personnel crews. The
Navy also has limited need for large numbers of reserve personnel
in the future because if ships are lost in combat there will be
more than enough crews available since the industrial base lead
time will preclude launching replacements for a conflict.
However, there probably will be an increased dependency on
shore-based USNR support units and individual reservists in
specialty areas.
The USMCR will change little. Although there will be budget
cuts and small force reductions, the Marine Corps' utilization of
its reserve will remain basically the same: small combat units
easily integrated with the bulk of the reserve in support units,
and command positions filled by both AC and Reserve officers.

In regard to the Coast Guard, faced with budget cuts, its
leadership has decided to make the USCGR the bill payer to
maintain the AC's strength. This decision will impact more on the
Coast Guard's domestic missions than on its small, but not
insignificant, national security role. The most significant
consequence will be on AC personnel for they will be required to
perform more weekend and holiday duty.
The AFRES, and to a lesser extent the ANG, are the most
integrated of all the RCs with their ACs. The Air Force war plans
show its intent to make full use of its reserve assets early in
any contingency operation. This is partially because the Air
Force is platform oriented; that is, the mission revolves around
aircraft. As the AC downsizes, more and more modern equipment
will flow to the reserves. However, in the distant future, should
the defense budgets continue to decline, there will emerge a
problem of aging aircraft. It is becoming increasingly clear that
there is also less need for ANG fighter units. The future will
probably see a substantial reduction in these units. It remains
to be seen, however, if the existing Guard assets are moved into
the support arena.
For those Armed Forces that depend heavily on having
available large numbers of pretrained individuals, the Army and
the Marine Corps, the Individual Ready Reserve will be
increasingly important as fillers and casualty replacements. The
downsizing of the AC forces will swell this reserve program, as
did the large Cold War forces, and then by the next century its
numbers will decline. The Clinton administration firmly opposed
abolishing the Selective Service System which, in the distant
future, once the IRR declines in numbers, will become
increasingly important as a manpower source.51
The other individual manpower pool, the IMA, may eventually
be removed from the Selected Reserve and returned to the
Mobilization Designee Program, which was volunteers within the
IRR. The Armed Forces will, by necessity, increasingly rely on
Selected Reserve units. Further cuts in the Selected Reserve will
be unacceptable and thus the IMA program may transition to the
IRR so that it does not count as part of the Selected Reserve
strength.
In the future, the RCs will become the "compensating
leverage," according to Secretary of Defense William Perry, to
reduce the potential risks accrued by accepting smaller AC
forces.52 In addition to providing support in the worst case
scenario, two major regional contingencies, the reserves will
also be involved in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement,
and humanitarian missions both at home and abroad.
To be able to provide that leverage regardless of the roles
or missions they assume, the Armed Forces Reserves must meet four
"imperatives" noted by the Reserve Forces Policy Board. First,
they must be well-organized, provided the most modern equipment,

fully trained within the time limits imposed, and fully sustained
annually. Second, they must continue to be affordable, that is
not only less costly, but effective and efficient in what they
do. Third, they must be relevant. To be so requires further
integration into their AC and thus properly molded to meet
national security and domestic requirements in the future. Last,
there must be immediate access to reserve individuals and units
by the Secretary of Defense.53 If the nation continues to rely on
citizen soldiers, then the mechanism must be in place that allows
for accessibility to reserve forces in peace and war. If all
these imperatives are met, the nation will continue to be
well-served by its citizen-soldiers.
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GLOSSARY
AC - Active Component
ADSW - Active Duty Special Work
ADT - Active Duty for Training
AFRES - Air Force Reserve
AGR - Active Guard/Reserve
ANG - Air National Guard
ARCOM - Army Reserve Command
ARNG - Army National Guard
ARPERCEN - Army Reserve Personnel Center
ASD/RA - Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve Affairs
AT - Annual Training
CFP - Contingency Force Pool
CONUS - Continental United States
DIMA - Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentees
DOD - Department of Defense
DOT - Department of Transportation
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
FSSG - Force Service Support Group
FTS - Full Time Support
GOCOM - General Officer Command
IDT - Inactive Duty for Training
IMA - Individual Mobilization Augmentee
ING - Inactive National Guard
IRR - Individual Ready Reserve
MARDIV - Marine Division
MARESFOR - Marine Reserve Force

MAW - Marine Aircraft Wing
MEB - Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MOS - Military Occupation Specialty
MUTA - Multiple Unit Training Assemblies
NGB - National Guard Bureau
OCAR - Office, Chief Army Reserve
ODT - Overseas Deployment Training
OOTW - Operations Other Than War
ORC - Organized Reserve Corps
RC - Reserve Components
RFPB - Reserve Forces Policy Board
RSC - Regional Support Commands
SFR - Standard Federal Regions
STARC - State Area Command
TAG - The Adjutant General
TAR - Training and Administration of Reserves
TPU - Troop Program Unit
TTAD - Temporary Tour of Active Duty
USAR - United States Army Reserve
USARC - United States Army Reserve Command
USCGR - United States Coast Guard Reserve
USMCR - United States Marine Corps Reserve
USNR - United States Naval Reserve
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